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Abstract
The distinction between episodic and semantic declarative memory systems, as
introduced by Tulving (1972, updated in 1984, 1991), was a revolutionary approach to
human memory. While the distinction is now widely endorsed in the study of memory,
there are debates about what constitutes each system’s domain, how each system is used,
how each system functions, and the phenomenal experiences associated with the
functioning of each system. On the basis of clinical studies and insights from conditions
affecting memory, this paper argues that the episodic/semantic distinction can be
reframed as a result of a unified declarative memory system. In this view, experiences are
encoded into memory traces, and retrieval of memories is dependent on the cues specific
to each particular instance of remembering. The upshot of this proposal, called unified

memory functionalism, is that the phenomenal differences of remembering can be
understood in terms of the differential salience of cues without defaulting to the view that
there exist multiple declarative memory systems.

0. Introduction
Differences in the ways we remember events and facts seem obvious. Memories
concerning where you set your car keys, what you did on your birthday, or that you need
to mow the lawn this weekend are clearly spatiotemporally-oriented. What a frog is, how
to multiply, or how to pronounce the name of your country aren’t. The distinction
between the spatiotemporally-oriented and not appears clear in most cases, and so it
seems reasonable that human memory systems are individuated in this way, as well: we
have an episodic system that cues event-related memories, while the semantic memory
system cues facts and concepts. This is the dominant view of declarative, long-term
memory.
There’s good reason this has become the dominant view on declarative memory.
Even discarding the seemingly common sense differences between episodic and semantic
memory systems, the separation appears especially prominent when looking at amnesic
persons. In cases of retrograde and anterograde episodic amnesia semantic memory and
knowledge persists while the ability to retrieve past events or imagine future events are
impaired. Famous clinical case studies such as those of patients H. M., K. C., and E. P.
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illustrate well such a differentiation. Patient H. M. could not recall any event that
happened after the date of a medical procedure (Klein, 2018), patient K. C. could not
recollect any personally experienced events throughout his lifetime (Rosenbaum et al.,
2005), and patient E. P. had “severe and extensive retrograde amnesia for facts and events
but [was] capable of retrieving memories from his early life” (Stefanacci et al., 2000, p.
7028). In each of these cases some separation between episodic and semantic memory
is clear: the patients typically retain semantic memory and knowledge and cannot retain,
at least at some level or through some time period, any episodic events. The presence of
episodic and semantic amnesia motivates the distinction promoted by Tulving.
There are reasons to believe this isn’t the full story, however, or even an accurate
one. Where the domain and function(s) of semantic memory appears less debated, the
domain and function(s) of episodic memory is far less well-defined. For a memory to be
event-oriented isn’t enough for it to be considered part of episodic memory. Even
temporally recent events can fall to this same category. If you are asked to remember
what you had for breakfast, you may simply recall the foods without imagining yourself
eating them, listing them less like an event that was experienced and more as we might a
semantic fact. Conversely, we might imagine an amnesic patient who no longer
remembers his wife’s name, or even that he has a wife, despite this no longer being eventoriented in context or content.
These cases question not only whether the distinction between episodic and semantic
are useful, but their very ontologies. On the basis of attention to these examples and
others, this paper advances an account of declarative memory according to which
memories for facts and memories of events are functionally encoded and retrieved by a
single system, and retrieval experiences are associated with two different sorts of
phenomenal experiences. Memory systems thus are not memory proper, but instead is
a unified cognitive function of encoding and retrieval whose traces present as specific
phenomenal experiences. Call this unified memory functionalism.
To elucidate the unified view, section 1 reviews Tulving’s view of episodic and
semantic memory systems, and currently received views concerning their functions and
interactions. Section 2 will provide meta-analyses of clinical case studies, memory
conditions, and counterexamples that call into question the validity of the received view.

2

Section 3 will outline the unified view by advancing the thesis that episodic and semantic
memories are supported by the same system. Section 4 will walk through the motivations
for the unified proposal, including applications to memory conditions, false memories,
and a positive account of the enhanced memory experienced by synesthetes due to an
expanded understanding of cues and retrieval. Section 5 will conclude the paper with a
survey of the unified framework.

1. Tulving’s Distinction between Episodic and Semantic Memory Systems
In 1972 Tulving suggested the view that would become widely endorsed in memory
studies: that human long-term, declarative memory is systematically dualistic, with the
episodic system encoding and retrieving memories related to events and the semantic
memory system encoding and retrieving memories of concepts and facts. Typically these
systems work in tandem, providing us with the full capacity of recollection. When we
remember going out to a restaurant with friends, we’re not only recalling that we left early,
traveled to the restaurant, met the friends, ordered food, and ate, but in recollecting these
memories we are also making use of concepts and facts like that of what a restaurant is,
the familiarity that friendship evokes, and the words it takes to retell the story. Episodic
and semantic memory systems together buy us the capacity of recollection of memories,
including facts and concepts that allow us to reflect upon and retell them.
In this section we will step through the received account and its view of the episodic
and semantic memory systems and their cross-functions and interactions, which will set
up the further discussion of problems with this view.

1.1 Episodic Memory
According to Tulving, the episodic system specifically encodes and retrieves memories
that are spatiotemporal in nature, and that it is the “highest human ontogenetic
achievement and as probably being uniquely human” (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011,
p. 16) though more recent studies show that other species may share anatomical and
functional homologs (Allen & Fortin, 2013; Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2010). Relying
on temporally-dated events (Tulving, 1984), the subsequent memory retrieves “details of
the event and of the place in which it occurred” (Moscovitch et al., 2016, p. 2). That I

3

remember putting on my shoes, going to the store, and picking up a jar of pickles are all
encoded using episodic memory. The episodic system isn’t constrained in any specific
temporal way, however, as you can remember temporally-dated events that are in the
future. For example, that you need to attend a meeting next Tuesday. While the event
hasn’t yet occurred, it is recorded as a future-oriented event within episodic memory. For
the present, remembering what you’re doing currently would appear to be in the domain
of short-term memory, though it isn’t far-fetched to say, “I am going to the grocery store
right now, as I do every Wednesday, and as I will continue to do,” implicating a longterm memory that can be oriented in all three temporal phases: the past, present, and
future.
An event can be determined in several ways. Brushing your teeth, buying a car, and
attending your wedding are all events. Doing all of these on a single day, albeit atypical,
would also be an event, or an event that is a set of other events. Subsequently, most
significant events that are encoded to episodic memory are also full of smaller, largely
inconsequential events that are recorded alongside or within the memory of the
significant one. What determines which events are encoded and which are forgotten are
at best correlated to the significance of the event to the person, such as the birth of one’s
sibling or child, or at worst due to happenstance, as in the case of remembering that last
week you slept with the windows open since the weather was nice. Forgetting is largely
along these same lines, with many significant events, like a set of all the birthdays that
have occurred in your life, being largely forgotten, and of course so too do many
insignificant events in our lives also go by the wayside.
Episodic memory is also said to evoke a feeling of familiarity with the event that is
recollected. As James famously wrote, “Memory requires more than mere dating of a
fact in the past. It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must think that I directly
experienced its occurrence. It must have that ‘warmth and intimacy’ … as characterizing
all experiences ‘appropriated’ by the thinker as his own” (James, 1890, p. 426).
There are several views of how episodic memory is realized within the received view.
For some psychologists and philosophers, episodic memory is analogous to mental time
travel (Michaelian, Klein, & Szpunar, 2016). In this way, when we remember an event,
we do so in a way that appears to us how we experienced it in the past. We then use it as
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a source of knowledge and may perceive the experience as imagining or simulating the
event we remember (Hopkins, 2014, 2018; Michaelian, 2018). When we think back to
our first day of school, it’s likely that you mentally time travel back to when the event
occurred, imagining your experience, what you saw, heard, smelled, and how you felt.
The nervousness, the smell of used schoolbooks and freshly sharpened pencils, and the
moment you first saw your soon-to-be best friend-and-classmate all vividly reappear
within your mind.
Connected to the presentation of episodic memory is autonoetic consciousness, or
the ability to place ourselves temporally within the memory, be it in the past or future.
The relationship between these two “gives rise to remembering in the sense of selfrecollection in the mental re-enactment of previous events at which one was present”
(Gardiner, 2001, p. 1351). Thus it’s often argued that for episodic memory to truly be
such, it must be accompanied by autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1985; Metcalfe &
Son, 2012; Michaelian, 2015).

1.2 Semantic Memory
Tulving’s view of declarative memory systems doesn’t stop at temporally-dated episodic
memory; rather, working in tandem is the semantic memory system. Where episodic
memory retrieves details about events, semantic memory provides the facts and concepts
that inform our conscious experience and allow for reflecting upon and the retelling of
our memories. Suggested to be at least in part its own neurocognitive system by
Warrington (1975), the semantic system retrieves the words we use and their meanings,
the facts and concepts we believe about the world, the formulas and algorithms that
govern our mathematical capabilities, our knowledge of historical events, and
understanding of causes and their effects, among other general and categorical knowledge
structures (Tulving & Donaldson, 1972; Binder & Desai, 2011). Retrieval of semantic
memory happens via simulation, “appearing as a kind of semantic imagining” and “a
matter of imagining a proposition that was the object of a past belief” (Michaelian, 2018,
pp. 101-102). They form what most people would consider general knowledge by way of
beliefs formed through “the organization of sensory, motor and higher-order features in
the brain built up of years of experience with the world” (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, p.
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466). It is specifically those experiences encoded by episodic memory that, for these
types of general knowledge, are used to form the semantic knowledge retrieved by the
semantic system.
To clarify the distinction between episodic and semantic memory within Tulving’s
framework, we can look at both typical and atypical cases. In the typical realm, while it
might be episodic memory that allows us to recall having once taken a biology test, it’s
our semantic memory system that allows us to recall what a test is and to recall facts about
the purposes of tests. In an atypical example we might imagine an amnesic patient who,
after some accident, loses the ability to process and retain episodic memories, and yet
can still use words to communicate, know what country in which they reside, and be able
to recall major national holidays. The typical case shows the contribution of these
memory systems to everyday phenomenal experience, while the atypical case
demonstrates the separation between the two systems as supposed by Tulving.
Akin to episodic memory’s reliance on autonoetic consciousness, semantic memory
has a similar reliance on noetic consciousness, according to Tulving. As described by
Metcalfe and Son (2012), noetic consciousness “allows an organism to be aware of, and
to cognitively operate on, objects and events, as well as relations among objects and
events, in the absence of the physical presence of those objects and events” (p. 292). In
stark contrast with autonoetic consciousness, however, noetic consciousness “does not
necessarily involve the self or anything self-referential” (Metcalfe & Son, 2012, p. 292).
Noetic consciousness is simply the presentation of objects, concepts, facts, and other
semantic information, likely without any reference to the self or imagining that the self
has any placement or involvement with the object or information.

1.3 Interaction toward Phenomenal Experience
Though Tulving’s distinction emphasizes two individuated memory systems whose
domains are largely distinct, this isn’t to say that these systems don’t interact. Rather, in
typical circumstances, Tulving says these two systems work in tandem to generate the
phenomenology associated with remembering.
To elucidate the phenomenal experience of recollection in a typical circumstance we
only need to look at the way we remember things in normal everyday life. Using an
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example previously discussed, remember again back to a time when you took a test in
school. You likely imagine the memory from your own first-person perspective, with the
feeling of an intimate familiarity, an event that is a set of subevents: that of taking a test
being the event proper, but full of smaller events like that of walking into the classroom
or test facility, receiving your packet from the proctor, marking on the paper, and the
feeling of nervousness or confidence depending on how confident you were in your
studying abilities, alongside many other memories of visuals, smells, feelings, and so forth
about the event. The experience alone, however, is not the entire story. Informing this
experience, and likely also contributing to the reflection on the memory itself, is semantic
memory, at play essentially behind the scene. It might be the episodic system that brings
about the memory of the event, but according to Tulving it’s the semantic memory system
that informs you what a test is, where they typically take place, the process for taking one,
and the significance of it for your grade (and, hopefully, that it’s a demonstration of
knowledge). In this way, for Tulving, both systems of memory work in tandem to provide
the full experience of recollecting taking a test.

2. Problems with Tulving’s Distinction
Tulving’s proposal has provided a persuasive account of long-term, declarative memory
for nearly 50 years, but its validity isn’t without controversy. Ambiguities in current
research into memory condition and the ways in which we experience both forms of
memory show a fair amount of ways to put pressure on and undermine the received view.
Such alternative accounts include Addis’ view that episodic memory and imagination
share the same constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Addis, 2018; Schacter and
Addis, 2007) and Roediger’s transfer-appropriate procedures approach, which suggests
the dissociations between retrieval processes is simply a reflection of the kinds of memory
tests being used (Roediger, 1990). In this section we will survey several ways to question
the received account, setting up the unified view as an alternative that satisfies these
concerns.

2.1 Sketchy Definitions
What has essentially traditionally differentiated episodic and semantic memories is the
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subject of the content of each type, but in recent literature these definitions have been
called into question. Specifically, clinical cases have shown that “the core constituents of
episodic memory as initially proposed (i.e., temporal, spatial, and self-referential) also
can be on display in semantic memory experience,” and, therefore, according to Klein
“…there appears no principled reason why the content of these two systems should differ”
(Klein, 2013, p. 2).
We can see how these boundaries break down using examples from both everyday
retrieval and clinical case studies. On the former, we can imagine retrieving such semantic
facts as “I know that the American Declaration of Independence was signed on July 4th,
1776,” “I know that I was born on a Thursday,” and “I know that prior to 1949 seatbelts
weren’t an option in American cars,” even if I can’t recollect any of these through my
own first-person experience. Nonetheless, each statement here is a case of semantic
memory that retrieves self-referential, spatial, and temporal content.
Some clinical case studies show a similar ambiguation. A patient presented by Stuss
and Guzman (1988) told of an [retrograde] amnesic patient who was able to “successfully
re-learn specific temporal and spatial details of his personal past” (Klein, 2013, p. 2).
One caveat, however, was that he could only retrieve such details as semantic facts,
omitting the first-person narrative that would otherwise enable one to imagine the past in
the perspective it was experienced.
As Klein notes, from these examples it would appear that “there is no logical or
empirical evidence supporting the assertion that only episodic memory makes reference
to the ‘where and when’ of past personal experience” (Klein, 2013, p. 2). Content alone,
this shows, cannot be the differentiator for these two types of declarative memory. While
he explicitly says this sharing of content between the two types doesn’t necessarily damn
such a taxonomy, it does give us good reason to rethink such a distinction and consider
alternatives that may better suit the evidence.
A second concern stemming from cases of episodic amnesia is that of narrative
construction and affected neuroanatomical structures. The study by Race et al. (2011)
shows that despite deficits in episodic memory and future thinking caused by medial
temporal lobe (MTL) damage, it does not correspond to defects in narrative
construction. This is supported by follow-up research by Craver (2012), which found
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evidence that even for patients with severe episodic memory deficits, such as amnesic
patient H. C., whose ability to construct scenes was still with normal range, “a kind of
temporal and spatial narrative construction [is] preserved” (p. 462). Another study by
Race et al. (2013) showed that patients with MTL damage who experience episodic
amnesia can still describe the present despite deficits in describing past and future
thought. As shown by Craver et al. (2014), patient K. C., who we previously discussed,
despite a severe case of episodic amnesia, still held intact a “concept of time, knows that
it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future,” calling into
question the belief that the hippocampus “plays an essential role in temporal
consciousness” (p. 191). It’s evident, then, that semantic memory can provide some level
of spatiotemporally-oriented narrative construction aside from the cues that would
otherwise be present with typical MTL function.
Examples like these show that such content isn’t simply the domain of episodic
memory as traditionally envisioned in Tulving’s framework, but is shared by semantic
memory in some capacity, as well. If that’s the case – if the very domain of episodic
memory is shown to lack the definition needed to qualify its existence apart from
semantic memory – this is problematic for the dominant view.

2.2 Phenomenology
The images conjured up to our consciousness during episodic retrieval appear vastly
different than the ways in which we retrieve facts, concepts, or words. When we vividly
imagine the last holiday party that we attended, with extreme detail, the experience of
recollection seems far different from the way in which we recall, say, a hammer, and
certainly not what comes to mind when we think of E = mc2. However, this isn’t to say
that these phenomenal experiences require separate systems, and this delineation quickly
becomes ambiguous when considering several cases of recollection.
Along these same lines we too can look at the phenomenology of memory errors as
evidence for such ambiguity. Whether it’s a simple misremembering, which is
successfully retained but retrieved inaccurately (Robins, 2016), or confabulation,
whereby people recall events and/or details that never happened, the result of each at
least appears to be approximately the same for the subject: that they believe what has
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been retrieved is accurate to reality.
For example, we can look at the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) Paradigm,
which uncovered misremembering as a memory error through memorizing lists of words
(Robins, 2014, 2016). In this experiment, participants are given a list of words which,
after some delay, they are asked to recall or recognize, all while being presented some
new but categorically similar semantic words (Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017). Results
of DRM Paradigm experiments have routinely shown that “participants exhibit false
memories robustly” and “they experience these memories in a vivid and detailed
manner” (Nabeta & Kusumi, 2009, p. 545.).
Meanwhile, the “lost in a shopping mall” experiment by Loftus and Pickrell (1995)
uses episodic retrieval of a false event to illustrate confabulation of an event’s details. In
this experiment participants were led to believe that, as a child, they had been lost in a
shopping mall, even though the entire story was made up. Participants were given several
true stories from their childhood along with the fake story, and then these were
constructed or supplied by family members. Of the 24 participants, 29% initially reported
remembering the confabulated event, and for some participants the confidence in the
false memory increased with each subsequent interview. The results of the study showed
that “people can be led to believe that entire events happened to them after suggestions
to the effect” (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995, p. 723).
It’s no surprise here that each of these cases, where there’s a phenomenal experience
of confidence in a false memory, implicate memory cues of various kinds, as both types
of memory errors are likewise ambiguous in nature. We’ve all experienced a simple
misremembering of an event and we too have all experienced some level of
confabulation. Such vivid examples and prominent experimentation aren’t necessary to
prove these cases exist, though. It isn’t difficult to imagine misremembering that we wore
a blue shirt last Friday when it was really a red shirt, and it also isn’t difficult to imagine
confabulating the features of a popular brand’s logo, as is common with anecdotal
Mandela Effect appearances. The Mandela Effect is a popular internet phenomenon that
documents common false memories for many people, the most popular example being
the false memory of the presence of a cornucopia in the Fruit of the Loom logo despite
it never featuring one. This type of collective confabulation tends to be of semantic
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information, generally of concepts or facts that have seemingly been confabulated. For
these kinds of memory errors, however, the phenomenology offers no distinction from
the truth: despite the error, the subject believes the memory to be true and feels the
familiarity common to such memories.
While it at first appeared that the phenomenal experiences of recollecting episodic
and semantic memories were differentiated, further consideration shows this divergence
is ill-defined. Blurring the lines between each memory system, what is retrieved, and what
it provides in terms of phenomenal experience, we should then ask what it is that
Tulving’s view buys us. For phenomenal experience, it doesn’t buy us anything more
than a generalized phenomenal experience for each kind of memory, but, as we’ve seen,
even that generalization is suspect.

2.3 Kinds
It’s obvious then that Tulving’s framework promotes declarative memory as two separate
kinds: that of episodic memory and semantic memory. But, as we have seen, the defining
features of each kind supposed by Tulving fall apart under scrutiny, undermined by the
very phenomenal experiences it used to establish each. Where the received view sees
episodic and semantic properties as being realized separately, establishing each kind of
declarative memory system, without such distinctions these realizers are far less obviously
dissociable and, instead, turn out to be mere cues without the required kind-splitting into
separate systems as traditionally assumed.
A brief account of such dissociable realizers, as termed by Craver (2004), would offer
some benefit here to elucidate this point. According to Craver, traditional arguments for
kind-splitting of declarative and procedural memory systems walk along these lines:
M1. Declarative memory and procedural memory can be independently
disrupted.
M2. If phenomena X and Y can be independently disrupted, then they have distinct
realizers.
M3. Procedural and declarative memory have distinct realizers.
M4. No Dissociable Realization (NDR). Instances of a natural kind have one and
only one realizer. If there are two distinct realizers for a putative instance of a kind,
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there are really two kinds, one for each realizer.
M5. So procedural and declarative memory are distinct kinds of memory. (p. 962)
If taking the received view of declarative memory, it is easy to simply replace mentions
of declarative and procedural memory with that of episodic and semantic memory
systems. The problem for the dominant view, of course, is that these realizers aren’t as
defined as supposed, and so the support for kind-splitting dissolves. Craver allows for
this possibility. In his discussion of NDR, he states, “NDR also leaves it an open question
whether the unification of two or more realizers that were previously presumed to be
disparate would mandate unifying the realized kinds (as in, perhaps, the case of rusting,
burning, and breathing)” (p. 962). Though it may be true that in such cases unification is
not required, we will make such a case for declarative memory in section 3.

3. Unified Memory Functionalism
The unified account advances the view that episodic and semantic distinctions are merely
functions and cues that are used to promote a unified phenomenal experience.
Functionalism is the widely endorsed theory of the relation between mental states to brain
and behavior (Dennett, 1991), a view that the mind is functional in nature; that is, “the
mind is (an aspect of) the functional organization of the organ of cognition” and that its
“functional organization is the plurality of components, functions, and organizational
relations that make up a mechanism and explain its capacities” (Piccinini, 2010).
According to functionalism, the mind is just the software on which the brain runs.
There are two main kinds of functionalism: “functionalism about mental states and
functionalism about mental contents” (Piccinini, 2004, p. 375). That is, either it’s the
mental state or the mental contents which are defined by their functional relations with
mental inputs, outputs, and other states or content, respectively. For declarative memory
we can interpret it with respect to mental state functionalism by virtue of a mental state
of recollection or retrieval. Consequently, with mental states inferring mental content
essentially, we will see how the distinction between episodic and semantic memory
systems proposed by Tulving dissolve, and instead work as cues that present as a unified
phenomenal experience, even if some of these cues are missing or impaired. Thus we
can now reimagine declarative memory in a radical functionalist perspective.
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In a typical functioning declarative memory system, experiences are processed into
traces, or engrams. The retrieval of memories, however, is dependent on the salience of
the cues specific to the memory. Hearkening back to the examples containing a ball, we
see memories retrieving cues of each type. “A ball” retrieves on cues such as quantity
and shape, and likely also cues such as material, feel, color, what sport or application it’s
used for, and may even have spatiotemporal cues such as bounciness, or if the ball is of
vintage construction or ancient application. “The ball I played with as a youngster” shows
other cues: all the aforementioned cues plus additional cues such as self-reference,
familiarity, events in which I used the ball, and the time in my life in which I used it. “The
ball the baseball player is holding” retrieves on cues of other sorts: the concepts and facts
of what is likely a baseball, as well as the self-reference and familiarity of present
experience of being in front of the baseball player holding the ball. “The ball I will buy
for my child” similarly retrieves on such cues, constituting factive cues and adding in
others of future-oriented memory and likely also an imagination or simulation of what
kind of ball I plan to buy, where, and when.
We should take a moment to differentiate this account from that of Tulving’s. The
standard model suggested two separate declarative memory systems, episodic and
semantic, which traditionally has claimed an inherent separation in types of content, with
episodic memory retrieving event-related content and semantic memory retrieving
general knowledge and facts. We’ve made the case, however, that these types aren’t as
differentiated as Tulving claims. By detaching memories from this binary organization,
we can instead look at memories more generally and see that the phenomenal experience
of recollection is dependent upon sensitivities to specific cues and how they are retrieved.
Cues, in this sense, are without Tulving’s kind-splitting into semantic and episodic
categories. The memory of what a ball is requires no cue of self-reference, familiarity, or
spatiotemporal context; likewise a memory of my last birthday party doesn’t immediately
require any cue to inform what a birthday party is; our memory of the concept or event
is simply just that, without reflection of any corresponding or informing cues. The
usefulness of these rigid categorical distinctions has worn out its utility, and instead can
be understood in functional terms.
We have thus far established that these declarative memories retrieve on cues that
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qualify different types of information. Here we come to another divergence with the
dominant view. Where the standard view sees memory conditions such as amnesia as a
result of a deficit of memory retrieval by a specific neuroanatomical region, the unified
view suggests the deficit isn’t with retrieval but in the salience of memory cues and
content. Memories are retrieved, but not all of its cues and content are not salient. This
is why we sometimes see traditionally episodic or semantic information still presenting
despite adverse impairment: the memory and its cues are still being retrieved, but the
processing and interpretation of the specific datum loses typical context. That amnesiacs
don’t necessarily lose all episodic or semantic information despite an impairment of the
corresponding neuroanatomical region is telling: it’s evidence that the traditional view of
impaired faculties has been too broad.
We can again look to the study by Klein (2013) as evidence for this reimagining of
retrieval within the unified framework. The patient, despite retrograde amnesia, was able
to relearn spatiotemporal details about his past. The only caveat was that he was unable
to place himself within these facts, and instead he retrieved them as semantic facts. Here
the memories themselves are intact and so are some of the appended cues, and he too
is still able to retrieve them, but there is a problem with processing at least some of the
cues, resulting in the loss of self-reference.
The same happens in some typical cases. Recalling the example of listing what you
had for breakfast, while it’s possible that you did so through a phenomenal experience
of imagining sitting down for breakfast with your family and remembering what you ate,
it’s also possible you simply remembered, akin to a semantic list, what you ate without
any imagining at all. Cues in this case take form of a combination of self-reference and
object-oriented characteristics: “I had pancakes, bacon, and eggs.” Despite the possibility
of spaciotemporal cues also affixed, such as “I had breakfast at 7 a.m.,” “I had breakfast
on the couch in my house,” and “I had breakfast with my sister,” these aren’t lost or
necessary; their retrieval, simply, didn’t require those specific cues. That they were absent
says nothing about the content; they’re still there, with the memory, but the cues and
content presented were only those salient to the person, and ones required to complete
the task of answering the question.
The dominant view doesn’t explicitly say so, but if we were to take a strict
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interpretation of it, we might be required to bring along entire memories and its details
when answering these types of questions. If we are to adhere to the narrow view that
episodic retrieval occurs only through imagining or simulation or even merely mental
time travel, it’s reasonable to think that answering the breakfast question brings along a
phenomenal experience of recollecting the entire event of having breakfast. Yet this isn’t
the case, and we can easily answer episodic questions via mere semantic facts, as I’ve
already shown.
The presence of a differentiated autonoetic and noetic consciousness in the unified
framework thus looks less like a requirement as Tulving suggests and more as a shared
presentation of a singular consciousness utilizing these same memories and their cues.
Since self-reference can appear without autonoetic consciousness, and semantic
information of events can present within autonoetic consciousness, any distinction, much
like that of episodic and semantic memory, is also ambiguous and unnecessary. Where
Tulving’s view might prescribe these types of consciousness as a way to describe the
traditional view of phenomenal experiences, the unified view requires no such
prescription.
Retrieval in the unified view, then, is simply the retrieval of memories utilizing salient
cues by a person sensitive to such cues, and as required for the chosen task. This broad
view removes the constraints of Tulving’s framework and instead allows for the
presentation of memories, even in the least typical circumstances, in a unified
phenomenal experience.

4. Motivating the Unified View
Memory conditions and deficits highlight how the unified view advances our
understanding of declarative memory. In the following brief accounts each condition is
reimagined within the unified framework, highlighting the differences in understanding
the ontology and etiology of each, as well as what it buys us in comparison to the standard
account.

4.1 Amnesia
H. M., after a surgical resection of his MTL, could not remember any events that
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happened to him post-procedure (Scoville & Milner, 1957). Despite his condition, he
was still able to learn new things. According to Klein (2018),
the dissociation between H. M.’s absence of memorial experience and his intact
learning ability could be accounted for by the idea that (a) memory exists in a variety
of types, (b) the availability of different types of memory can explain performance on
different types of tasks (e.g., semantic memory explains how he learns new facts;
procedural memory explains how he learns new skills; implicit memory explains how
he learns to solve priming tasks); and (c) only the type of memory accompanied by a
feeling of reliving (i.e., episodic) was impacted by his surgical procedure. (p. 127)1
Klein describes H. M.’s case in the view of the standard model of pluralistic memory
types. Reimagining it within the unified framework, however, shows a slightly different
story. Instead of memory existing in a variety of types, memories are retrieved using the
specific cues that connect to the traces. For patient H. M., his faculties’ abilities to append
and interpret these cues to memories was impaired by his anterograde amnesia.
Sensitivity to these cues and the efficacy of faculties that interpret them explain the
specific performance on different types of tasks. Lastly, the absence of memories
pertaining to self-reference is affected by impaired cues on specific memories that pertain
to first-person reliving and the accompanying feeling of familiarity. That he was still able
to learn some things, however, including things that were self-referential, shows that some
cues and the interpretation of them were still intact. Where the dominant view chalks H.
M.’s abilities up to a matter of separate memory systems which strictly constrains what
may be learned, the unified view allows H. M. and other amnesic patients to achieve
memory retention specific to the unimpaired cues and interpretation. The unified
account readily allows for H. M. to create new memories despite his impairment, aligning
with the actual presentation.
Similarly, the case of patient K. C. and his severe anterograde amnesia demonstrates
the benefits afforded by the unified view. Patient K. C., while “incapable of recollecting
any personally experienced events (Rosenbaum et al., 2005, p. 989),” still “understands
the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his
personal past and future” (Craver, 2014, p. 191). Similar patients have likewise
1

Edited to remove in-line references.
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demonstrated the ability to “know they have personal futures and care about them”
(Craver, 2016, p. 978). Even without any ability to imagine the future, spatiotemporal
orientation and self-reference persist.
The unified view affords a flexibility that accurately aligns with aspects of amnesia
that Tulving’s account would otherwise find counterintuitive due to its rigid definitions.
But these qualities are only counterintuitive due to these imposed constraints; once
removed by the unified proposal, amnesia, its effects, and these types of presentations
are accounted for by way of retrieval failure associated with self-referential cues.

4.2 Category-specific Agnosia
While there are many types of agnosia, category-specific agnosia and its reliance on a
traditional conception of semantic memory is particularly interesting within the unified
framework. Category-specific agnosia, a syndrome of impaired object identification and
perception, results in an inability to accurately recognize objects that share categorical
content or description.
Take, for example, a lemon. A semantic representation of a lemon would include
facts about lemons such as that they are yellow, sour, a fruit, are grown on trees, and that
their juice and zest are used in making lemon meringue pie. A person with categoryspecific agnosia may have difficulty recognizing that it is in fact a lemon and not an apple
or grape or watermelon, despite obvious differences between these objects to those not
afflicted with the syndrome.
There are several theories of how this type of agnosia presents the way it does, though
of particular interest is the view that it involves organizing memory based on the
categorization of semantic details. Such a view, however, quickly devolves in a nearendless amount of categorization that our memory would need to index. As Humphreys
and Forde (2001) suggest,
Given the diversity of the information considered to be “semantic,” and the fact that
there are fundamental differences in the nature of the knowledge involved (i.e., some
pertains to the sensory properties associated with an object [e.g., it is brown and has
floppy ears] and some reflects how two or more objects relate to each other [e.g.,
dogs chase cats], etc.), it is perhaps surprising that all of this information is considered
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to be represented in one homogenous “store.” (p. 455)
It’s no surprise, then, that they come to the same conclusion as the one that motivates
the unified view. They go on to argue that
the concept of a “semantic system,” in any unitary sense, may be one of the victims
of an attempt to define the nature of our stored knowledge in more detail. If the
“semantic system” retracts to no more than the form of knowledge recruited to
perform a particular task – with this knowledge differing across tasks, then the
“system” becomes a fiction. (Humphreys & Forde, 2001, p. 455)
This is the benefit of the unified view: there’s no longer a constraint to semantic
information, information types, or categories on which the information must be grouped.
Instead, the unified view relies on sensitivity to cues of specific memories, better
accommodating category-specific agnosia. Instead of endless categories of information
that should be connected between objects and their memories, it’s merely an impairment
of a sensitivity to specific cues and their differential salience that are affected by the
agnosia. An inability to recognize lemons and similar fruits are based on a differential
salience toward that specific cue, with no required slippery slope into other similar
categories or features. This specific kind of agnosia thus constrains one’s ability to retrieve
memories on that cue, with no expected impairment of related or corresponding
descriptor.
This view also serves as a way to explain some mysteries of category-specific agnosia.
Outlined by Bub and Bukach (2001), some patients with this syndrome experience
trouble identifying man-made objects in comparison to biological ones. In their
description of the problem, however, they state, perhaps ironically, that in trying to find
an etiology for such trouble there are no “shared perceptual features or structural
dimensions for most of these objects” (Bub & Bukach, 2001, p. 479). What Bub and
Bukach are missing, however, is the obvious cue that is retrieved on: that the object is, in
fact, man-made, or not. By invoking the salience of cues within the unified framework,
we can account for even the most general presentations of category-specific agnosia, as
such cues can be as broad or specific as the object permits.

4.3 Memory Errors and False Memories
18

As Robins (2019) notes, “Accounting for confabulation is . . . an important desideratum
for any candidate theory of memory” (p. 2135). While we previously used memory errors
as a way to detail several problems with Tulving’s distinction, now we will account for
false memories within the unified view. Where we have previously looked at memory
conditions that included impairments and advantages, in this section we will briefly look
at ordinary cases of false memory: misremembering and confabulation.
Misremembering is defined by Robins (2016) as
a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. When a
person misremembers, her report is inaccurate, yet this inaccuracy is explicable only
on the assumption that she has retained information from the event her
representation mischaracterizes. (p. 432)
We often and ordinarily misremember past experiences (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). For
example, perhaps after asked what you had for breakfast, you answer “eggs,” but really
you had waffles today, and it was in fact yesterday when you had eggs. Or when asked
how old you are, you misremember your age as the one prior to your recent birthday.
Sometimes misremembering is accompanied by a near-immediate feeling that the
information you just recalled is wrong, and we actively work to search our internal
memory for the accurate, or what we feel is a more accurate, answer.
There are several accounts for how misremembering comes about. One such
account is briefly visited here. The causalist view implicates intact memory retention but
inaccurate memory retrieval (Michaelian, 2016). We needn’t get into the specifics of the
causalist account, but instead we can elucidate the unified view’s contribution to the
account on the grounds that both issue views based on a function, or process, and not on
the content itself. That is, the content of the misremembered memory is not at stake
here; rather, causalist account implicates the process of recollection as the etiologic
reason for misremembering. This is supported by experiments by Wang et al. (2018) on
the effect of self- and other-referencing in the DRM Paradigm, finding that “false
memories are not malfunctions of cognitive processes, but that true and false memories
may originate from similar memory mechanisms” (p. 83). There’s good reason for this:
all we have to do is remember the often-accompanying correction to our
misremembering. What this correction shows is that the content of the memory is intact,

19

but for some reason, in the moment of retrieval, we did so incorrectly. Therefore, it’s the
cue retrieval that is in error.
The unified view supports this suggestion. The memories and their cues are intact,
as is shown by the accurate correction of misremembering, but the process by which
these cues are retrieved and interpreted is temporarily incorrect. It may be that the
required faculty is monopolized by other processes, such as the default mode network
(DMN), which is implicated in spatiotemporally-oriented memories (Addis, 2018;
Gerrans, 2014; Hutto, 2017; McCormick et al., 2014).
In contrast to misremembering is confabulation, or “remembering” events that “draw
on information from many sources; their explanation does not require appeal to a
particular past event that has been distorted” (Robins, 2016, p. 434). A famous case of
confabulation outlined by De Brigard (2014) uses the example of the El Al cargo plane
crash which left 43 people dead in Amsterdam, an event that was spoken about on news
shows for weeks. Utilizing a questionnaire that was handed out to hundreds of
Amsterdam residents, H. F. M. Crombag and a team of psychologists collected answers
on their recollection of the event, of which 55% of residents remembered having seen
footage of the actual crash. The problem, as you might guess, is that no such footage
exists. Here we see how confabulation works: there may be some event(s) which provide
information toward a constructed, though not real, event that the person remembers.
Thus a confabulation is not true memory, but instead is akin to the act of seeming to

remember, as outlined by Bernecker and others (Bernecker, 2017; Teroni, 2018).

2

The unified account suggests that confabulation comes about in near-opposite the
way of misremembering. As opposed to an intact memory content and temporarily
impaired retrieval process implicated in misremembering, confabulation is impaired in
both ways: first, by the absence of a true memory and, second, an impaired retrieval
process. Confabulation unjustifiably retrieves and interprets cues of true memories and,
from these, constructs a cogent narrative, which presents as the phenomenal experience
of recollection, or something resembling such. This would account for why

2

Confabulation, in this view, isn’t evidence of any effort, conscious or otherwise, on part of the person to
“have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating
reasons” (Keeling 2018, p. 1215). The unified view infers no reference to attitudes or motivating reasons
at all.

20

confabulations tend to utilize portions of actual memories that retrieve on cues relevant
to that which prompts the confabulation. In the case above, the confabulation’s etiology
is based on the actual event of the plane crash as it was experienced by the residents, but
the confabulation presents as a result of cues that are interpreted in ways that facilitated
scrambled retrieval attempts.

4.4 Synesthesia
While we’ve seen accounts of memory conditions and errors as compelling motivations
for the unified view, a thorough application should similarly offer compelling results.
Where this unified account has filled in negative gaps otherwise exposed by memory
conditions and errors, we too can look at positive cases, where this proposal contributes
an understanding of neurological conditions where memory isn’t incumbered but instead
is advantaged. Synesthesia presents a such a case.
Synesthesia is a neurological condition whereby “an otherwise normal person
experiences sensations in one modality when a second modality is stimulated”
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001, p. 4). A synesthete may, for example, see letters or
numbers as inherently colored, shapes or colors when hearing sounds, taste textures
otherwise reserved for the touch, experience time non-linearly, among other meshing of
the senses. While synesthesia is sensory in nature and specifically doesn’t infer memory
as an explanatory process for its etiology (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001), it has also
shown to accompany significant advantages for memory (Rothen et al., 2012; Luria,
1968). As we will see, these advantages are at least in part owing to the ways in which cues
within the unified model work.
In one study of six time-space synesthetes by Simner et al. (2009), it was shown that
the synesthetes were more accurate at dating events (and didn’t slow their typical
recollection in doing so), were able to generate more autobiographical events in the given
year, and learn more while retaining memories for longer (Mills et al., 2006; Rothen &
Meier, 2010). Rothen et al. (2012) describes this finding as evidence of these synesthetes’
advantage of being able to use the spatial form generated for the memory as “internal
‘place holders’ to anchor events in time” (p. 1959). It also found that the advantage to
synesthetes is more apparent in long-term memory than short-term (Rothen et al., 2012).
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This characterization conforms nicely to the concept of cues within the unified
framework of long-term, declarative memory. For synesthetes, as they perceive stimulus
or objects with an atypical accompanying description, this description is then appended
as an additional cue that non-synesthetes lack. These extra cues, or which Meier and
Rothen (2013) describe as additional retrieval cues, give an advantage to synesthetes.

5. Conclusion and Final Thoughts
Tulving’s distinction for episodic and semantic memory systems says that the episodic
system deals with event-related memories, while the semantic memory system deals with
general and world knowledge. I have motivated an alternative framework, unified
memory functionalism, to better explain problems for the dominant view rooted in cases
of misremembering, confabulation, amnesia, category-specific agnosia, and synesthesia.
Within a unified memory functionalist framework, experiences are encoded into
memory traces, and retrieval of memories is dependent on the cues specific to each
particular instance of remembering. This view accommodates more accurately the
intricacies seen in the phenomenal experiences seen in various memory conditions,
errors, and advantages.
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